constitution making (research handbook)
Tags: Williams - Research Handbook on Post-Conflict Statebuilding
Consitution Making
- iraqi constitutionalism
- tunisia consitution writing was transparent
- egyptian constituion writing was not
- constitution making now largely emphasizes citizen involvement
- ex tunisia, kenya, south africa, thailand, papua new guinea, uganda, brazil
- debates about the inclusiveness of the process vs inclusiveness of the adoption
Constitution Writing in Egypt
- 2 constitutions: 2012 and 2014
- both lead by the intermim military government (SCAZ)
- low legitimacy
- 2012 -> egyptian parliment selected members to assembly
- 2014 -> rewrite due to problems of 2012, 2014 did not include islamists in parliment
Consitution Writing in Tunisia
- Written by the National Constituiant Assembly
- Body had the power to adopt
- public could vote on the members
- first draft was adoped by a 2/3rds vote
- More inclusive over multiple drafts that were relased to the public
Constitution Writing in Conflict Zones
- How to permit public engagement with security issues?
- How to prevent actors from co-opting the process?
libya
- Fissures between the National Transitional Council (NTC), the General National Congress (GNC), and Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA)
- Eternal problem: who gets a seat?
- UN largely helped to push it along, despite many issues such as the appelate court ruling against the CDA and various boycotts
yemen
- National Dialogue Conference in 2013 with the post GCC mediated transition
- Produced over 1800 recommendations
- Document was lauded, spoiled by the houthis and south Hiraak movement
- Both wanted a 2 region state
Multiethnic Governence
- Two main patterns
- Consociationalism -> accomdation via guarenteed representation
- Centripedalism -> moderation of ethnic group views
Consociationalism
- Protects specific ethnic groups from harm
- usually grants some combo of autonomy, veto or partial veto, political representation
- “A peace treaty extended to government”
- Issue: sometimes accomodates ethnic extremists
Centripedalism
- Rewards moderate behavior
- Mechanisms such as:
- alternative vote
- candidates requiring plurality of vote across ethnically diverse territories
Models
-
Ethnic federalism
- Form of consoctionalism
- questioned whether this actually exasterbates or ameloriates confict
- usually has some of:
- protection for cultural and linguistic identity - south africa
- ethnic based “self rule” - ethopia
- subnational constiutions - iraq
- political and legal autonomy - KRG/iraqi kurdistan, ethopia
- political decentralization
-
- no centripedal or consociationalism
- one big unitary state envisioned
-
- some consociational features
- de facto ethic federation
Human Rights
- Egypt and Tunisia both explictly refer to human rights law
- Tunisia has actual mechanisms to enforce
Enforcement
- Constitutions lack legitimacy if not enforced
- Concept of “Abusive Constituionalism” - Use of mechanisms of constitutionalism to undermine democracy
-
Egypt
- no consitutional court
-
- constituional court
- multiiple new comissions
Conclusion
- constituion making in conflict make be the norm
- there must be a state as a prereq