McQuinn: DDR and the Internal Organization of Non-State Armed Groups [04a759ee]

Argues that ddr can be seen through rebel groups with their command structure and financing

Posists two axes:

Compares maoist fighters in nepal, FARC in Colombia, thubactics battlion, and autodefensas unidas de colombia (AUC)

Links to Kalyvas - The Logic of Violence in Civil War and

• Roy Licklider's seminal study that that 5 years is a standard for peace

• Also talks about liberia's war based networks and command structures playing a role in DDR

  • same in burundi
• Notes that relationships between group's internal structure and DDR trajectories have not been studied

• Civil wars did not account for heterogenity of non-state armed groups until quite late

• Several factors

  1. frequency and severity
  2. economic drivers
  3. onset
  4. duration
  5. outcomes
  6. peacemaking negotions

• Paper used

  • recruitment strategies
  • rebel governance
  • economic models for group formation
  • prevalance of child soldiers
  • the strategies behind violence against communities
  • fighting tactics
  • pre-war social networks
  • role of gender
  • persistence of small and lightly armed guerilla groups
• Uses Weinstein: Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment
• incorporates Staniland - Networks of Rebellion

• Comand profiles can be driven by terror or internal organization

• Quasi-judicial processes can enforce greater cohesion, leading to lower levels of uncertainty

  • maoist fighters in nepal did this, were able to prevent from going back to war despite long term reintegration being stalled

• terror caused by individual groups can lead to higher levels of uncertainty, ruling through fear

  • autodefensas unidas de colombia (AUC) did this

• Financing can be either predation on the local community, which leads to higher levels of organizatoin, or resource-extractive based, leading to lower levels of coordination