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Murphy: United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of Force [74277f04]

Tags: lebanon, somalia, papers, un and global governance lecture 5

  • Examines unifil and UN operations in somalia, especially wrt to the rule of engagement

  • Two aspects of the use of force in peacekeeping

    • Minimum use of force

      • This was used (and crossed) by the somilia missions

        • going after a specific actor placed the UN as "one actor among many"

    • Force for self defense only

      • UNFIL's stand and holding villages has allowed them to maintain a pretense of neutrality
  • somalia as a testing ground for new use of force rules (chapter VII)

  • UNIFIL has been awkward since the lebanese gov has depended upon it for various enforcement activities

    • UNIFIL ROE has been modified to become less restricive over time, as compared to the UNPROFOR (somalia) ones, where they were very restrictive

    • after May 1993, the UNOSOM II ROE was changed to become a "blank check"

      • UNOSOM II ROE was largely confused and no effort was made to integrate (especially with the italians)

        • incoherence of Italians, where the italians knew how to negotiate whereas the rest of the UN forces did not
  • UNIFIL not confronting the PLO meant that they couldn't confront the Israeli de facto forces either
  • UNIFIL stand at At-Tiri lead to the creation of Force Mobile Reserve